Stock ownership and political behavior: evidence from demutualizations by Kaustia, Markku et al.





























Stock Ownership and Political Behavior: 
Evidence from Demutualization 
 
 
SAFE Working Paper Series No. 2 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2209645 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2209645
Stock Ownership and Political Behavior:  








February 26, 2013 
Abstract 
A natural experiment in which customer-owned mutual companies converted to publicly listed 
firms created a plausibly exogenous shock to the stock market participation status of tens of 
thousands of people. We find the shock changed the way people vote in the affected areas, with a 
10% increase in share-ownership rate being followed by a 1.3%–3.1% increase in right-of-center 
vote share. The institutional details and additional tests suggest that wealth, liquidity, and tax-
related incentives cannot fully explain the results. A plausible explanation is that the associated 
increase in the salience of stock ownership causes a shift in voters’ attention. 
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1.  Introduction 
A voluminous literature studies what makes individuals own and trade different types of 
financial instruments (for reviews, see Guiso, Haliassos, and Jappelli, 2003; Campbell, 2006; 
Curcuru et al., 2010; and Barber and Odean, 2012). Less studied in the literature is the idea that 
the asset holdings themselves may also influence individuals’ behavior. In this paper, we analyze 
this question in a domain with potentially far-reaching consequences on society. Specifically, we 
analyze  how people’s stock market participation status affects their voting decisions  in 
parliamentary elections.  Portfolio heterogeneity can lead to different levels of wealth 
accumulation. Theory suggests that wealthier owners, in turn, shift their voting toward market-
oriented policies that protect their wealth  (DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1999; Biais and Perotti, 
2002; Dietz and Haurin, 2003; Pagano and Volpin, 2005 and 2006; Perotti and von Thadden, 
2006). 
The idea that ownership affects behavior is not new: Engels (1873) proclaimed that “the 
worker who owns a little house to the value of one thousand thalers is certainly no longer a 
proletarian…” The presumption that investing in stocks influences people was also underlying 
the New York Stock Exchange’s campaign to promote the stock market in the 1950s (Traflet, 
2003). More recently, political commentators saw President Bush’s Ownership Society initiative 
as a strategy for crafting an “investor class” that was expected to lock in millions of votes 
(Nadler, 2000;  Barnes, 2004).
1  These policies toward increasing ownership could influence 
                                                 
1 Other government initiatives targeted at increasing ownership are widespread, including programs for privatizing 
state ownership in 59 countries (Jones et al., 1999). These programs often involve retail investor incentives intended 
to attract a large stockholder base (Keloharju, Knüpfer, and Torstila, 2008). Bortolotti, Fantini, and Siniscalco 
(2001) show right-of-center governments are more likely to privatize state-owned companies, possibly in an attempt 
to gain new voters.   2 
voting by providing stronger incentive for better property rights and lower capital gains and 
dividend taxes, in the spirit of classical models of political economy. 
Together with these incentives, new stockholders also have an incentive to become informed 
about the stock market and the economy. This incentive can alter their information acquisition, 
and to the extent that it also promotes interest in societal issues at large, could make stockholders 
more likely to vote in national elections. This shift in attention can increase sympathy for free-
market-oriented right-of-center policy by causing people to interpret issues through the lens of an 
investor.
2  We  bundle  these  attention-related  channels  under what we call  stock ownership 
salience. 
An ideal experiment on the effect of stock ownership on voting behavior would involve a 
random assignment of shares to a group of individuals and a control group of otherwise identical 
individuals. An analysis of the stock ownership salience effect would also require an exchange of 
an existing asset for a listed stock, with other economic factors, such as wealth, held constant. 
Cross-sectional analyses not involving such exogenous shocks do not allow the identification of 
a causal effect,  as  omitted variables are likely to simultaneously determine financial 
circumstances and the behavioral outcomes of interest. 
Our empirical setting comes reasonably close to the ideals outlined above. The identification 
strategy exploits a series of plausibly exogenous shocks to the stock market participation status 
of a large group of people. These shocks originate from conversions of mutually held regional 
                                                 
2 Mullainathan (2002) develops a model of human memory in which even uninformative signals influence beliefs 
if they affect what people recall. In Mullainathan, Schwartzstein, and Shleifer (2008), a key strategy adopted by a 
persuader is to influence the lens through which the decision-maker views the attributes of an object. Goidel, 
Shields, and Peffley (1997) and DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) provide evidence of media exposure affecting voting 
decisions.  A large literature in political science  under the term “agenda-setting” discusses how the framing of 
information can affect the electorate (McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Edwards, Mitchell, and 
Welch, 1995; Weaver, McCombs, and Shaw, 2004).   3 
telecommunications firms into publicly listed companies in Finland in the 1990s.
3 Prior to the 
demutualizations, there were 17  mutuals, and three of them chose to demutualize. The 
demutualizing firms covered 20% of the country and serviced over 400,000 customer-owners 
who would obtain shares in a newly listed public corporation that would continue the operations 
of the old mutual. For about 120,000 individuals who did not previously hold any publicly listed 
stock, these events represented a shock to their stock market participation status holding paper 
wealth constant.
4 The process did not entail a transfer of property rights—the owners, as well as 
the assets they owned, stayed the same. These features of the demutualizations make the setting 
unique and allow us to identify the effect of a geographically clustered change in the type of 
asset ownership on voting behavior.  
The ownership data we use are the official records of title and are therefore of very high 
quality as well as free of biases associated with survey data. We merge the ownership data with 
similarly reliable election results at the zip-code level, as well as a large set of demographic and 
socioeconomic variables including wealth, income, education, homeownership, age cohort 
shares, and population density.  That these data originate from official government registers 
means they are comprehensive, reliable, and do not suffer from measurement error problems 
associated with survey-based data sets. These  rich  data  also  allow us to rule out the usual 
suspects that can plague natural experiments of a similar type—the results do not seem to be 
                                                 
3 Demutualizations are not exceedingly rare. For example, one third of the US mutual life insurance companies 
demutualized between 1995 and 2004 (Erhemjamts and Leverty, 2010). Unfortunately, detailed ownership data is 
not available in those cases. 
4 We explicitly control for changes in wealth caused by the stock price fluctuation during the sample period. In 
theory, the mutual form could be less valuable if the bundling of customer and stockholder roles leads to inefficient 
risk-sharing (Fama and Jensen, 1983), or if the absence of a threat of outside takeover makes managers more likely 
to extract private benefits (Lamm-Tennant and Starks, 1993). On the other hand, Mayers and Smith (1986) show 
empirical evidence suggesting benefits to a mutual form. The publicly listed stock is also more liquid, which can 
increase its value. We analyze the issue of liquidity in detail in the last section of the paper.   4 
driven by systematic differences between the treatment and control areas, other violations of the 
exclusion restriction, or a weak instrument.  
Our main analysis utilizes the demutualizations in a two-stage panel regression in which 
right-of-center vote share is explained with instrumented share ownership. The instrument, an 
indicator for a zip code having experienced a demutualization, does not suffer from the weak 
instrument problem  as  the  demutualizations cause a substantial  increase in stock market 
participation. Share-ownership rates in the treatment towns are 49% to 71% higher over the long 
term, relative to other towns, conditional on a large set of control variables, as well as zip-code 
and election fixed effects. 
The results show instrumented share ownership is positively and significantly associated with 
right-of-center voting. Our preferred (and most conservative) estimate suggests a 10% increase 
in the stock market participation rate translates into a 1.3% increase in the vote share of the main 
right-of-center party (t-value 2.1). Different definitions of the dependent variable, subsamples, 
and control variables generally produce larger and more significant estimates. We put together 
several pieces of evidence that collectively speak against violations of the exclusion restriction—
the assumption that the demutualizations did not have an impact on voting through any channels 
other than stock market participation.  We first note that  our fixed effects panel  regressions 
control for many observable characteristics and any time-invariant unobservables. For example, 
the demutualizing areas are more urban than other areas, which is captured by the zip-code fixed 
effects and a variable measuring population density.  
In addition, we employ matching estimation using the same large set of observable covariates 
and additionally including the pre-treatment right-of-center vote level and vote trend as matching 
variables. These analyses help in addressing the exclusion restriction in the following way. The   5 
process of demutualization itself could have been endogenously triggered by an omitted variable 
that had an influence on right-of-center voting independent of share ownership. For example, 
underlying differences in the support for free markets and the beneficial role of the stock market 
might have played a role in the acceptability of the demutualization (although the formal 
decision to demutualize was made by the company general meeting without any obvious political 
motives). Towns that demutualized might also have been independently becoming more right-of-
center prior to the demutualization. We capture the right-of-center vote levels and trends by 
voting data in the four-year period preceding the start of the sample period. We use these pre-
treatment vote variables in matching estimation: the analysis compares demutualizing towns to 
areas that did not demutualize but had similar characteristics, as well as similar pre-treatment 
voting levels and trends. Matching by trend has the additional benefit of controlling for the 
possibility that areas differ in terms of their sensitivity to national patterns of right-wing support, 
as a treatment area is compared to a control area with a similar pre-treatment electoral swing 
pattern. The results from adding pre-treatment levels and trends do little to change the conjecture 
that the demutualization events were plausibly exogenous conditional on observables. 
We investigate and document two further issues related to the mechanism of the influence on 
voting. First, we analyze whether the increase in right-of-center vote share is due solely to shifts 
in party choice or whether it is caused partly by changes in voter turnout patterns. Employing 
two-stage regressions similar to those used for identifying the impact of ownership on vote 
shares,  we find some evidence that share ownership increases  voter  turnout.  Our analysis 
suggests, however, that changes in turnout may only be a partial explanation for the shift to the 
right and that some of the effect is due to shifts in party choice.   6 
Second, the unique features of the setting as well as results of additional analyses allow us to 
consider several alternative explanations for the observed voting patterns. Recall that the process 
of demutualization into the corporate form does not entail a transfer of property rights—the 
owners, as well as the assets they own, stay the same. The rich data also allow us to explicitly 
control for wealth. Furthermore, we find the extent to which people sold their shares after a 
demutualization in an area is not reliably related to future voting patterns. These results suggest 
an increase in wealth and in its liquidity are not driving the effect. To a small extent, the change 
in corporate form increased incentives to favor a lower tax policy. This effect, however, appears 
to be small (an additional gain of about 60 cents per year from a one percentage point decrease in 
the  tax rate). Policy uncertainty lowers the expected value of the benefit even further. The 
features of the setting, the additional analyses, and the small tax effects suggest the results cannot 
be fully explained by wealth and tax channels. A potential explanation is stock ownership 
salience that can influence voting either directly or by amplifying the effect of any perceived 
changes in direct economic incentives in the voter’s mind. 
In addition to the literature on political economy and persuasion discussed earlier, our paper 
relates to recent work on politics and portfolio choice. Empirical studies on portfolio choice 
show that political preferences are strongly related to the stock market participation decision 
(Kaustia and Torstila, 2011) as well as the industry tilt in stock portfolios (Hong and 
Kostovetsky, 2012). Bonaparte and Kumar (2013) find that politically active individuals, 
regardless of their political affiliation, are more likely to participate in the stock market. Our 
paper  also  shares a theme with papers that investigate the impact of exogenous shocks on 
individuals’ beliefs. Di Tella, Galiani, and Schargrotsky (2007) find that Buenos Aires squatters 
who were given land titles developed more individualist and materialist beliefs while DellaVigna   7 
and Kaplan (2007) document that the introduction of the Fox News Channel increased 
Republican voting in the affected areas. 
The outline of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces data sources and 
discusses the institutional details of the demutualizations. Section 3 develops the identification 
strategy. Section 4  presents the main results from panel regressions,  and  section  5  includes 
extensions and robustness checks. Section 6 discusses mechanisms, and section 7 concludes. 
2.  Data and institutions 
Our dataset includes comprehensive information aggregated at the zip-code level on (a) 
results in Finnish parliamentary elections, (b) ownership of shares in the area, and (c) a large 
number of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. The number of zip codes is about 
2,500, and we have data from the 1991, 1995, 1999, and 2003 elections. 
A.  Elections 
Elections for the 200-seat Finnish Parliament are held every four years. No other elections 
that could introduce biases, such as referenda, take place on the election day. Finland uses the 
d’Hondt constituency list system, typical of multiparty proportional representation systems. The 
number of parliamentary seats each party receives is proportionally determined by party-level 
vote totals in each of 15 regional constituencies. This voting system presents advantages for our 
analysis in comparison with a two-party, district-based majority voting system. First, as results 
count towards total party representation, voting behavior is less likely to be biased by strategic 
voting  for a non-first-choice candidate seen as more electorally viable. Second, as each 
constituency offers a choice between hundreds of candidates, party-level election results contain   8 
less noise generated by variation in the vote-getting ability of individual candidates. For further 
details of the electoral process and results, see Nurmi and Nurmi (2004). 
The election data come from Statistics Finland, the official governmental statistics agency. 
We obtain the number and distribution of ballots cast on election day for each voting precinct. 
The data also include the number of voting-aged (18 on or before the election date) inhabitants in 
each voting precinct as of January 1 of the election year. 
The voting data for 1991 through 1999 include the votes cast on election day (a Sunday). The 
voters also have the alternative to vote through a postal ballot system before the election. The 
2003 postal votes are allocated to the precinct level, which allows us to work with the regional 
distribution of all votes. For 1991 through 1999, we are able to analyze only the election-day 
votes. However, the correlation between party vote shares in the postal votes and election-day 
votes is very high. 
In some cases, a voting precinct can cover several zip codes. However, the vast majority of 
the population in a particular voting precinct usually resides in a single zip-code area. We match 
each precinct to a zip code following the procedure in Kaustia and Torstila (2011). 
B.  Share ownership 
The Finnish Central Securities Depository maintains records of stock directly held by all 
individuals in practically all listed companies in Finland. Our ownership data cover the period 
from January 1995 to November 2002. For a detailed description of the FCSD data, see, for 
example, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000). 
Based on these data, we calculate the number of stock market investors in each zip code at 
the time of the parliamentary elections. During the study period, elections took place in 1995 and 
1999. The 2003 elections took place four months after the coverage of our stock ownership data   9 
ends. The ownership data from November 2002 serve as a proxy for the ownership at the time of 
the elections in March 2003. 
In determining the local number of stock market participants, we count all those individuals 
who have common stock in their account at the time of the election, and divide that number by 
the total number of inhabitants in the zip code. Although the reason for this definition is 
ultimately imposed by data considerations, we note the direct share holdings are by far the most 
important means of participating in the stock market in Finland. During the sample period, no 
personal retirement accounts existed  in Finland  and mutual funds were a relatively new 
phenomenon. Kaustia and Knüpfer (2012) provide a more detailed discussion of these issues. 
C.  Demographic and socioeconomic controls 
Statistics Finland provides a number of demographic and socioeconomic zip-code-level 
variables for the years 1991 through 2003. These data originate from registers maintained by the 
government  and are practically free from the usual measurement error problems present in 
survey-based data sets (such as the US Census). For 1991, we only have the total number of 
inhabitants by zip code. For 1995 through 2003, we have the proportion of people in various age 
cohorts, median income, mean wealth, level of education, unemployment rate, proportion of 
owner occupied dwellings, population density, and proportion of females. 
Although using the exact timing of the elections in the analyses would be tempting, we 
choose not to do so, because some of our control variables for 1999 are only available at the end 
of year 1999 when all the demutualizations had taken place. We use data from 1995 and 2003 
instead in a two-period panel regression. Collapsing the time series into  pre-  and post-
demutualization states has the further benefit of mitigating the issue of inflated t-values in a   10 
panel with many observations per each cross-sectional unit  (see Bertrand, Duflo, and 
Mullainathan, 2004). 
We have 2,753 total zip codes before excluding 22 located in the autonomous island province 
of Åland, where the major parties do not set candidates. We further eliminate 121 zip codes with 
undefined geographical boundaries, boundary changes between the elections, or no information 
on the number of inhabitants available. After merging these zip codes with the ownership data, 
we have 2,610 zip codes. In the regressions, we further require that each of the three major 
parties have received at least one vote, that the zip code has all the control variables available, 
and that the dependent variable does not fall outside its 1st and 99th percentiles (the results are 
robust to relaxing this last requirement). This procedure gives a final sample size of about 2,300 
zip codes each year. 
D.  Demutualizations 
Telecom services in Finland are provided in a decentralized manner by a number of local 
telecom firms, as well as one partially government-owned company. In the early 1990s, none of 
these firms were publicly listed. 
To obtain a landline telephone, a prospective customer would have to acquire a certificate of 
participation in the local mutual company. The mutuals issued the certificates  and  acted as 
market makers. The certificates were transferable, so a private individual could sell one  to 
another due to, for example, relocating outside the service area. One could also commonly find 
certificates in estate auctions.  
In the late 1990s, some of the local telecom companies had expanded into new businesses, 
such as providing wireless services, and some of them started investigating the possibility to 
convert into a publicly listed firm. Three firms, which operated in areas that cover about 400 zip   11 
codes, chose to go ahead with the conversion. From the viewpoint of the customer certificate 
holders, the demutualization events were plausibly exogenous to voting behavior, a position we 
elaborate in the following section 3. 
The main features of these conversions are as follows: 
 
•  The firms were Tampereen Puhelin (TP), Keski-Suomen Puhelin (KSP), and Helsingin 
Puhelin (HP). Figure 1 shows the zip codes covered by these firms on a map of Southern 
Finland. The shares were listed on March 17, 1998, September 28, 1998, and July 1, 1999, 
respectively. 
•  The 1999 parliamentary elections were held on March 21, so two of the conversions took 
place before the 1999 election day and one between the 1999 and 2003 elections. 
•  The number of listed shares obtained with one mutual certificate was fixed and did not 
depend on customer type or telephone usage. Some individuals and companies had several 
certificates. 
•  The market values of shares obtained from the conversion of one certificate were 3,088 
euros, 2,145 euros, and 262 euros for HP, TP, and KSP, respectively, at the close of the 
listing day. The differences in the values reflect differences in both the market values of the 
firms and the number of certificate holders that divide the market value. Any sale of the 
certificate or a subsequent sale of the stock was subject to capital gains taxation at a rate of 
25% until 2000 after which the rate rose to 29% up until 2006.   12 
•  The vast majority of the recipients did not sell the shares. Selling rate estimates imply that 
about 75%–85% of the recipients still held their shares after three years of the 
demutualizations. 
3.  How the demutualizations solve the identification problem 
Our identification strategy relies on the idea that the demutualizations generated ownership 
changes that in many respects resemble randomized, and exogenous, shocks from the viewpoint 
of  the individuals receiving the shares.  Individuals in the demutualizing towns  serve as the 
treatment group, whereas all other individuals belong to the control group. The benefit of this 
research design is that it can, under certain assumptions, address the causality of ownership on 
voting behavior. Below we present our identification strategy, and then address potential 
endogeneity concerns. 
A.  Regressions 
Before presenting the models we use, it is instructive to consider a simple panel regression 
that attempts  to document the influence of share ownership on voting behavior. The model 
explains the right-of-center vote share with share ownership: 
  it it it e p c + =α ,  (1) 
where i and t index zip codes and elections, cit is the right-of-center vote share, pit is the 
share-ownership rate, and eit is the error term (the intercept is omitted from the formulas but is 
included in all the models). Unobserved heterogeneity makes the estimation of α challenging. 
The omission of observable and unobservable characteristics that jointly determine ownership 
and voting behavior is likely to bias the estimate in a way that is not known a priori.    13 
The first step to control for omitted variables is  to include all the relevant observable 
variables and control for zip-code and election fixed effects. Such a model is 
  it t i it it e v u p c + + + + = it X β α ,  (2) 
where cit is the right-of-center vote share, pit is the share-ownership rate, Xit is a vector of 
observable characteristics, ui and vt are zip-code and election fixed effects, and eit is the error 
term. 
Natural candidates for observables Xit are wealth, income, education, home ownership, age 
composition, and population density (see Guiso, Haliassos, and Jappelli, 2003, and Curcuru et 
al., 2010, for reviews on the determinants of stock market participation). Zip-code and election 
fixed effects control for time-invariant zip-code and election characteristics. A zip-code fixed 
effect could, for example, be due to a local media slant related to stock market sentiment or 
political bias, not captured by observable variables. The election-year fixed effects control for 
simultaneous shocks to ownership and political views, such as varying IPO activity. 
Although model (2) is a significant improvement over model (1), its causal interpretation is 
still hampered by time-varying shocks that jointly influence ownership and voting. Here we take 
advantage of the ownership shocks generated by the demutualizations. We estimate the 
following instrumental variable regression with 2SLS: 
  it t i it it e v u I p + + + + = π δ it X   (3) 
  it t i it it it f h g I p c + + + + + = γ β α it X ˆ .  (4) 
The first-stage regression explains share ownership by observables Xit and an indicator Iit 
taking the value of one if a zip code i has experienced a demutualization in time t and zero   14 
otherwise, and zip-code and election fixed effects. The second-stage model includes the same set 
of observables, the zip-code and election fixed effects gi and ht, and an error term fit. The second-
stage model (4) explains the right-of-center vote share with the instrumented ownership rate 
from regression (3).  
The exclusion restriction of the model is the assumption that demutualizations have no direct 
effect on voting in addition to their impact on share ownership, conditional on the control 
variables. In effect, we restrict the coefficient γ = 0 to capture this assumption. If the exclusion 
restriction holds, the 2SLS model successfully identifies the causal influence of share ownership 
on voting behavior. 
B.  Potential endogeneity concerns and matching methods 
The identification rests on the assumption that the demutualization treatment did not coincide 
with any other change in determinants of the right-of-center vote share, conditional on the 
control variables of the model. The controls we include capture differences between the 
treatment and control areas in many plausible determinants of voting, including population 
density,  wealth, income, education, and age composition.  The variables also control for the 
economic motives to carry out a demutualization in particular types of areas.
5 Therefore, the 
regression effectively compares a treatment zip code to a control zip code that is similar to the 
treatment area along observable characteristics. We believe this identification strategy makes 
significant progress in aiding a causal interpretation. 
                                                 
5 The argument is that the demutualizations were plausibly exogenous from the viewpoint of individuals. It is still 
possible that a firm serving one area may be more likely to demutualize than another firm operating in another 
identical area, due to unobserved heterogeneity at the level of firms. While this would not be a problem in our 
research question, it would undoubtedly complicate the analysis of other types of questions, say, regarding the 
corporate finance aspects of demutualizations.   15 
In addition to making sure the conclusions are not confounded by zip code characteristics, we 
also take into account the possibility that the outcome itself, i.e., right-of-center voting, might 
have changed in response to aspects other than stock ownership. We do this by using a matching 
method that makes it possible to include the pre-demutualization vote trends and vote levels in 
the treatment and control areas as additional control variables. The inclusion of pre-treatment 
vote trends and levels in the matching estimation is a good remedy against three remaining 
endogeneity concerns. 
First, if the demutualizations took place in areas that were independently becoming more 
right-of-center, the estimate of the impact of the demutualization would be upward  biased. 
Relatedly,  the underlying political sentiment might have made it easier to carry out a 
demutualization in an area with a greater right-of-center voter base.  
Second, decisions to demutualize may have been influenced by politicians observing that the 
practice is becoming favorable with voters in certain areas. More than a decade after the events, 
however,  no evidence or even speculation regarding political motives to demutualize has 
emerged, suggesting the political effects we document are largely an unintended consequence. 
One  might  still  wonder if politicians influenced  the demutualization  decisions.  The  formal 
decision to demutualize was made by the company general meeting that had no obvious political 
motives  and the demutualization did not need government approval. Nevertheless, political 
influence would not violate the exclusion restriction as long as the effect on voting came through 
increased share ownership. But if right-of-center politicians perceive an underlying favorable 
political trend in an area, and attempt to boost this further by increasing share ownership, then 
the estimates would overstate the causal effect of share ownership. Matching on political trends, 
as described above, alleviates  this concern. Institutional details also make us think this   16 
mechanism is not plausible. Connections between firms and politicians are weak in Finland. 
Faccio (2006) documents that in the end of 1990s, firms with political connections represented 
0.14% of market capitalization in Finland, compared to 7.7% around the world. Transparency 
International consistently ranks  Finland as the least (or second least) corrupt country in the 
world.  
Third, areas may differ in terms of their sensitivity to national patterns in the vote.
6 Since the 
natural experiment coincides with a national increase in the right-wing vote, our estimates may 
be upward biased if the treatment areas have a propensity to produce larger electoral swings than 
the control areas. 
All of these concerns are alleviated by the matching analysis, as it uses both the right-of-
center vote share in the 1995 election and the 1991-1995 vote trend as matching variables. The 
matching analysis thus identifies the treatment effect from control areas that have the same pre-
demutualization vote level, the same pre-demutualization vote trend, and the same control 
variables as the treatment areas. The results, presented in section 5, are similar to the results 
obtained with the 2SLS framework. 
4.  Results from panel regressions 
A.  Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of the treatment and control areas pooling data over the 
three  elections  in the sample period (1995, 1999,  and 2003).  Panels A and B document 
differences between the treatment and control towns along many dimensions. The residents in 
                                                 
6  As an example, political analyst Nate Silver’s blog (http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/) refers to this 
tendency as elasticity and provides values for state elasticities in US presidential elections.   17 
treatment towns have higher income, better education, and the areas are more densely populated. 
For example, the median annual income in the treatment towns equals 16,740 euros, whereas it is 
only 12,010 euros in the control towns. Panel C reports logit regressions that explain an indicator 
for a zip code experiencing a demutualization with zip-code characteristics measured in 1995, 
prior to any demutualizations had taken place. The logit marginal effects confirm many of the 
univariate results: wealth, education, and population density are significantly correlated with 
demutualizations  (but income, unemployment, home ownership, and the share of female 
inhabitants are not). The rightmost column shows that the right-of-center vote level in 1995 and 
the change in right-of-center vote share from 1991 to 1995 are also systematically different from 
other areas  demutualizations.  In demutualizing towns, the right-of-center party lost votes 
between the 1991 and 1995 elections, but the vote share in 1995 was still higher than in other 
towns. Our regressions and matching models will control for all of these differences.  
Our main variable of interest, the vote share of the main right-of-center party, equals 22.2% 
and 12.7% for the treatment and control towns, respectively. The six largest parties account for 
88.4% and 90.7% of the votes cast in these areas. Share-ownership rates equal 19.5% and 7.9%. 
As these numbers are averaged over the three elections,  they include any impact from  the 
demutualizations. 
Figure 2 breaks down the sample into the three elections, and plots the share-ownership rates 
in treatment and control areas at the time of elections. Before the conversion, the treatment towns 
have a participation rate that is about 5.2 percentage points higher than in the control areas. From 
1995 to 1999, the participation rate increases by 5.8 and 0.8 percentage points in the treatment 
and control areas, respectively. Two demutualizations had taken place between these two 
elections, whereas one demutualization occurred between 1999 and 2003. During this period,   18 
share-ownership rate increased by 4.4 and 1.4 percentage points in the treatment and control 
areas, respectively. 
Figure 3 plots the vote share of the main right-of-center party in the treatment and control 
towns over the sample period. The right-of-center vote share in the control areas is relatively 
stable over time and ranges from 11.3% to 12.6%. More time variation is present in the treatment 
areas: from 19.5% to 24.2%. This time-series variation is great enough to mask any influence of 
demutualization in the univariate analysis, which is not surprising unless one expects the effects 
to be very large. We have argued that the relatively small changes in property rights involved in 
the demutualizations (the same owners still own the same assets, only in different form) should 
not make us expect effects of such magnitude. We turn to multivariate analyses next. 
B.  First-stage estimates 
The success of our identification strategy depends on the validity of the first-stage regression. 
A strong instrument should produce a large, significant, and persistent positive impact on share 
ownership in the treatment towns, controlling for simultaneous changes in town characteristics. 
In other words, the coefficient π in model (3) should be positive and significant. 
Table 2 presents results of the first-stage regressions. Our models collapse the data into two 
periods, 1995 and 2003, and estimate the impact of the demutualization as the change in the 
share-ownership rate from 1995 to 2003 between the treatment and control towns. Including 
multiple (e.g., annual) observations per cross-sectional unit in a regression would run the risk of 
producing  inflated  t-statistics, but this is less of an issue in  a two-period comparison  (see 
Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan, 2004). The demutualization dummy equals one for the 2003 
election in all the towns in which the demutualization took place and zero for all other   19 
observations. We include town and year fixed effects that control for confounding time-invariant 
influences. 
We consider five variants of the model that include different sets of the observables Xit. The 
simplest version is one with only the demutualization coefficient and zip-code and election fixed 
effects (unreported), appearing in the first column of Table 2. The next two columns add two 
different sets of continuous control variables: wealth, income, education, and unemployment, 
and these variables supplemented with home ownership, population density, and proportion of 
females. The two remaining columns allow for non-linear relations by breaking down each 
control variable into 10 decile dummies (excluding one for each variable). All the regressions 
also include eight unreported age-profile  variables that calculate  the share of inhabitants in 
cohorts of 10-year intervals. Variables are log transformed to reduce the influence of skewness 
and to give the coefficients an interpretation as elasticities. The t-values are robust to clustering 
at the zip-code level.  
The bare-bones model in the first column produces a positive and highly significant 
coefficient on the demutualization dummy, which suggests the treatment areas showed a much 
larger increase in the share-ownership rate than the control areas. The coefficient value of 0.396 
(t-value 22.1) implies that the share-ownership rate increases  e
0.396  –  1  =  48.5%  in the 
demutualization towns (the dependent variable is the log of the stock market participation rate). 
The richer models suggest  even  stronger effects: the estimates amount to a 64.9%−71.3% 
increase in the share-ownership rate. The t-values are equally large in all specifications, ranging 
from 25.8 to 27.2. 
Allowing time variation in the predictors of share ownership does not render the effect of the 
demutualizations  insignificant. But many of the predictors are significantly related to share   20 
ownership. For example, wealth, education, and home ownership are positively related to share 
ownership. 
The explanatory power of the demutualization dummy is impressive: the F-statistic ranges 
from 407.4 to 757.6. These numbers clearly indicate that the null of having a weak instrument is 
rejected.  
C.  Second-stage estimates 
The previous section showed that the demutualization dummy is a valid instrument for share 
ownership.  In this section,  we assume zip-code fixed effects and observable characteristics 
suffice to control for any relevant differences, including pre-treatment trends and possibly 
different local  sensitivity to national elections. In effect, we are assuming the exclusion 
restriction is not violated; that is, the coefficient on the instrument Iit in model 4 equals zero. We 
implement the IV approach by running standard 2SLS regressions in which  the  first-stage 
regressions come from Table 2. We use the fitted values from these regressions in lieu of the raw 
share-ownership variable and adjust the standard errors for the estimation of the fitted values. 
The regressions employ all the same observables from the first-stage regressions and also the 
zip-code and election fixed effects. 
Table 3 reports the results of the 2SLS regressions. Here we follow the setup in the first-stage 
table in which each specification adds either new control variables or allows for more flexible 
functional forms. The richest specification appears in the last column that includes all the control 
variables broken down into decile dummies, as well as variables measuring the share of each age 
cohort, and zip-code and election fixed effects. 
Across the specifications, income and wealth positively predict right-of-center  voting, 
whereas unemployment rate is negatively associated with right-of-center votes. The coefficient   21 
estimate for the instrumented share ownership starts with the value of 0.32 in the first column (t-
value 4.3) and ends up taking the value of 0.14 in the fullest specification (t-value 2.1). These 
estimates suggest a 10% increase in the share-ownership rate increases the right-of-center vote 
share by 1.3%−3.1% (the models measure both the dependent and independent variables in logs 
so the magnitudes are 1.1
0.324−1 = 3.1% and 1.1
0.139−1 = 1.3%). Broader definitions of right-of-
center voting, discussed later, produce even larger estimates.
7 
The economic significance of the effect appears to be meaningful. The average vote share for 
the main right-of-center party equaled 12.5% in the 1995 election. The treatment predicts (Table 
2, specification 5) an increase of 71.3% in participation (the dependent variable in Table 2 is 
logged so the increase equals e
0.538 – 1). Applying this number to the low-end-estimate of the 
coefficient in the second stage (from Table 3, specification 5) predicts a change of (1+0.713)
0.139 
– 1 = 0.078, that is, a 7.8% increase in the right-of-center vote. Applied to the 12.5% base level, 
this amount translates into a 0.97 percentage point increase in the right-of-center vote in the 
mean zip code. 
A 1.2 percentage point increase in the right-of-center vote share appears to be a meaningful 
effect, as elections are always won at the margin. One point of comparison is the result in 
DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007), who  study the effect of the introduction of Fox News on 
Republican voting, and find an effect of 0.4 to 0.7 percentage points on US presidential vote 
shares between 1996 and 2000. 
The estimates from our preferred model imply a considerable increase in right-of-center 
voting following an  exogenous increase in share ownership. This conclusion follows from 
                                                 
7 Panel B in Table 3 reports the simple OLS results where we do not instrument for share ownership. The share-
ownership variable attracts a positive and significant coefficient that is smaller in magnitude than the 2SLS 
estimates. This finding suggests inferences from simple OLS estimates are likely to understate the true effect.   22 
showing our instrument has enough power to potentially have a meaningful impact on voting and 
that the results are robust to many different specifications—even the strictest specification that 
allows for a non-linear relation between control variables and vote shares. In the next section, we 
turn to estimating the effects with matching techniques that allow us to explicitly control for pre-
treatment trends, in addition to the host of control variables used in the panel regression. We also 
discuss  further robustness checks that modify the definition of the dependent variable,  and 
discard towns that were not able to demutualize. 
5.  Matching estimation and robustness checks 
This section discusses matching estimation to establish the robustness of the main results 
derived using the 2SLS framework. The results show that the 2SLS estimates are unlikely to be 
generated by plausible violations of the exclusion restriction. We then address other robustness 
issues using the 2SLS analysis. 
A.  Matching estimation 
In this section, we use matching estimation in which we match the demutualizing towns 
(treatment areas) to control areas that have similar characteristics and pre-demutualization vote 
patterns. The inclusion of the vote patterns—the pre-treatment level and trend of the right-of-
center vote share—adds an additional layer of controls vis-à-vis the 2SLS method. Specifically, 
the pre-treatment vote variables address the potential violations of the exclusion restriction that 
were outlined in Section 3.B. These include the possibility that demutualizations took place in 
areas that were independently becoming more right-of-center and that the right-of-center voter 
base in a town made it easier to carry out a demutualization. The matching method also helps to 
rule out the possibility that the results are driven by right-of-center politicians perceiving an   23 
underlying favorable political trend in a town, and trying to boost it further by increasing share 
ownership. Finally, the matching method helps to control for the possibility that areas differ in 
their sensitivity to national patterns in the vote: treatment areas which produced larger electoral 
swings in the pre-treatment period are compared to control areas with similar swings. 
We estimate the average treatment effect—that is, increase in right-of-center voting due to 
demutualizations—using the covariate matching estimator discussed in Abadie and Imbens 
(2006).
8 Specifically, the matching method finds control towns that are the nearest neighbors for 
each treatment town based on observable characteristics. The choice of the nearest neighbors is 
governed by a match metric that measures the distance in characteristics space between the 
treatment observation and a potential control observation. We report results for the inverse-of-
the-variances metric (Abadie and Imbens, 2006) and the Mahalanobis metric (Rubin, 1980; 
Zhao, 2004). We also estimate the treatment effects correcting for the bias that stems from the 
inability to find a perfect match for each treatment town using the method of Abadie and Imbens 
(2011). 
The covariates we use for matching are based on non-forward-looking information that was 
available in 1995, before any of the towns had demutualized. Therefore, the control towns are 
similar in terms of observables to the treatment areas in 1995, except they did not demutualize. 
The observables we use in matching include  all  the categorical dummy variables for the 
socioeconomic characteristics used in the paper thus far and also the pre-treatment level and 
trend in right-of-center voting. The vote level is the logged right-of-center vote share in 1995 and 
                                                 
8 We also experiment with the familiar propensity score matching estimator (see, e.g., Heckman, Ichimura, and 
Todd, 1997 and 1998). It produces estimates that are statistically significant and often larger in magnitude. We 
prefer to err on the side of caution and report the results using the covariate matching method.   24 
the trend is the difference in logged right-of-center vote shares between the 1991 and 1995 
elections.  
Table 4 shows the treatment effects estimated using the nearest neighbor method. Panels A 
through D show the results for matching on 1, 2, 4, and 6 nearest neighbors. Columns 1 through 
3 in each panel report the estimates based on the inverse-of-the-variances distance metric, the 
Mahalanobis distance metric, as well as the estimator that corrects for the match discrepancy 
bias.
9 
Across all the specifications, the treatment effect is positive and statistically highly 
significant. The point estimate ranges from 0.092 to 0.127 and the z-values range from 3.6 to 5.4. 
Because  we are using logged variables, the additional percentage increase of right-of-center 
voting in the affected towns amounts to 9.6%–13.5%. The treatment effect here is somewhat 
larger than in the 2SLS framework where the most conservative estimate suggests a 7.8% effect 
(see section 4.C.).  
We estimate two modified versions of the basic model that further improve matches along 
the two pre-treatment political variables. First, we break down the continuous right-of-center 
vote trend and level variables into decile dummies. Second, we match the two variables as close 
as possible by giving them more weight in the distance metric. The estimates from these 
alternative approaches always  remain  statistically significant and the  lowest  treatment effect 
equals 8.1%. 
Taken together, the matching estimates show that differences in pre-treatment vote trends or 
vote levels do not drive the strong relation between share ownership and political behavior. This 
                                                 
9 Allowing for a larger number of matches increases efficiency, but tends to increase bias due to poorer overall 
match quality (Imbens, 2004; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). The bias-corrected estimator is robust to the choice of 
the number of matches, and corrects for the remaining match discrepancy (Abadie and Imbens, 2011).    25 
result suggests that the estimates of the 2SLS framework are not generated by the violations of 
the exclusion restriction outlined in Section 3.B. Furthermore, the matching framework rules out 
any  other  violation of the exclusion restriction that relates to the differential political 
environment in the treatment towns prior to the demutualizations. 
B.  Alternative dependent variables 
We now return to the 2SLS model and report two additional robustness checks. The baseline 
model calculates the right-of-center vote share using the votes cast for the National Coalition 
Party, the main right-of-center  party.  We consider alternative ways to define the political 
outcome variable, as the Finnish parliamentary system involves many parties. 
Panels A and B of Table 5 show how the results change if we include in our definition of 
right-of-center vote share the votes cast for the Center Party. Despite its name, the Center Party 
is clearly right-of-center in the Finnish political spectrum. Hix and Lord (1997) provide a 
quantitative classification of major Finnish parties on a left-right axis (1 to 10). The main right-
of-center party (National Coalition) receives a score of 7.4, the Center Party is 7.0, and the main 
left-of-center party (Social Democrats) is 4.4. The mean among the six largest parties is 5.5. In 
many rural areas, the left-right spectrum runs from the Left Coalition and Social Democrats to 
the Center Party, whereas the National Coalition may have only a small vote share in such areas. 
The prominent position of the Center Party comes from its roots as the promoter of the causes of 
farmers. 
These  regressions suggest our previously reported results are lower bounds of the true 
effects. Effects on center vote shares in Panel A are all strongly significant and large—even more 
so than the impact on National Coalition  vote shares. Panel B sums the Center  Party  and   26 
National Coalition vote shares and yields estimates that are comparable to those obtained in the 
baseline model, but are more precisely estimated (t-values range from 5.9 to 10.1). 
Panel C looks at the left-of-center vote share. Consistent with the right-of-center parties 
gaining voters from the left, the slope estimates are negative. However, their magnitudes are 
smaller than the estimates for the main right-of-center party vote share. In only one specification, 
the t-value is not significant at conventional levels. The most comprehensive specification yields 
a coefficient estimate of –0.08 with a t-value of –1.98. Perfect symmetry should not be expected, 
since the left-of-center share is not a linear combination of the right-of-center and center vote 
shares.  Smaller parties are present that  are more difficult to classify along the right-left-
dimension. One such example is the Green Party which often promotes free-market mechanisms 
on issues such as labor markets, yet generally advocates tough regulation and taxation of capital 
markets. 
Panels D and E run regressions in which the votes cast for the National Coalition and the 
Center parties are divided by the total votes cast for the three largest and the three medium-sized 
parties. The medium-sized parties are the Left Coalition, the Green League, and the Swedish 
People’s Party. All the specifications produce a positive coefficient, and most of the estimates 
are statistically significant. 
C.  Subsample with mutuals 
Some of the zip codes in our main dataset were not serviced by any mutual phone company 
in the late 1990s. Instead, these mostly rural areas were serviced by a partially government-
owned countrywide operator. To test whether this feature of the data affects the results, we drop 
all observations in which no mutual company existed in the first place, which leaves a subsample 
of mutuals that decided to demutualize versus mutuals that did not. The results are reported in   27 
Table 6. The point estimates for the demutualization dummy in the first stage-regression range 
between 0.42 and 0.52 depending on the specification, whereas the second-stage coefficients 
take values of 0.14−0.31. These subsample estimates are close to the baseline results in Table 3, 
with statistical significance largely unchanged. 
6.  Mechanisms 
The results thus far show the demutualizations had a robust positive impact on right-of-center 
voting in the affected areas. In this section, we make an effort toward understanding the channels 
that intermediate share ownership and voting. We first analyze the extent to which the effect is 
due to changes in voter turnout versus vote switching. Then turning to underlying drivers, we 
discuss motives related to property rights, liquidity, and taxation, and finally consider the stock-
ownership-salience hypothesis. 
A.  Voter turnout 
An increase in the right-of-center vote share can be due to either shifts in policy preferences 
of existing voters or changes in the voter turnout pattern. Stock owners may, for example, be 
more motivated to vote than non-owners as  a result of acquiring and processing more 
information about the economy. In this section, we analyze how stock ownership affects voter 
turnout. 
Table 7 presents regressions corresponding to those in Table 2, but replacing the vote share 
with voter turnout. Voter turnout is defined as the number of votes cast divided by voting-age 
population. The slope estimates of the share-ownership variable are positive but small in all 
specifications. In the full model, a 10% increase in participation predicts a 1.1
0.025 − 1 = 0.24%   28 
increase in turnout. Statistical significance is also weaker: the full model yields a t-value of 0.99, 
suggesting that we cannot reject the null that voter turnout was not affected. Nevertheless, it is 
useful to see what one would need to assume about the impact of demutualizations on voter 
turnout to reconcile the increase in right-of-center vote share fully with the point estimates of 
voter  turnout. First recall the demutualization dummy predicts a 71.3% increase in stock 
ownership (Table 2, specification 5). Applying  the predicted increase in ownership to  the 
coefficient of turnout (Table 7, specification 5) gives 1.713
0.025 − 1 = 0.014; that is, turnout is 
expected to increase by 1.4% in the demutualizing areas. If all of the new voters were to favor 
right-of-center, the 1995 mean right-of-center vote share of 12.5% would increase to (12.5% + 
1.4%) / 101.4% = 13.6%, an increase of 9.5%. The actual increase in vote share we found in 
section 4 was 7.8%, so it could in principle be exclusively  coming from new voters. It is, 
however,  unlikely that all of the new votes would have  been  cast for one party alone. For 
example, if only half of the new votes were for right-of-center, the resulting increase in right-of-
center vote share would be 4.7%, less than the total effect. These considerations lead us to 
conclude that turnout may explain part of the effect but that vote shifting is also taking place. 
B.  Wealth  
Direct economic incentives would be the prime candidate to explain the link between 
ownership and voting behavior. Such incentives can arise from issues related to wealth or taxes. 
Recall, however, that the demutualizations did not have a direct effect on property rights, as the 
asset merely converted to a different legal form. Incentives for having better protection of 
property rights thus did not change in the conversions. Our empirical analysis also controls for 
possible wealth changes due to other reasons. For example, stock market participation leads to   29 
greater wealth accumulation over the long-term (Mehra and Prescott, 1985; Cocco, Gomes, and 
Maenhout, 2005). 
An additional wealth-related channel factors in the issue of liquidity. Before the conversion, 
the asset provided a utility flow (phone service) and the owner was effectively locked in the 
asset, facing a high fixed cost of selling. But once phone services and ownership were decoupled, 
owners could sell their shares in the stock exchange for a fraction of the transaction cost they 
faced earlier. The ease of selling likely relaxed liquidity constraints for some households. Better 
liquidity might be interpreted as a cash windfall, which could change an individual’s perception 
of her financial situation and thus alter her political behavior. 
Our data allow us to construct a measure of liquidity constraints, namely, the amount of cash 
investors in a particular zip code withdrew from (or invested in) the stock market. Specifically, 
we calculate a sell-buy ratio that equals the total value of stock market sells in a zip code divided 
by the corresponding value for buys. We then relate this sell-buy ratio to right-of-center voting in 
the now familiar 2SLS framework. We replace the stock-ownership variable with the logged sell-
buy ratio, collapse the data into one observation per zip code, and calculate changes in all the 
variables between the 1995 and 2003 elections. We add pre-treatment levels of the control 
variables to the regression to control for zip-code-level differences in the propensity to sell 
shares. For example, zip codes that were wealthier to begin with likely saw fewer withdrawals in 
the 1995−2003 period, even after we condition on the changes in wealth in the same period. 
Table 8, Panel A, reports the first-stage results from a regression of the sell-buy ratio on the 
demutualization indicator and the control variables. Not surprisingly, the demutualization 
indicator attracts a positive and  significant coefficient  across all specifications. This finding 
implies the residents in the demutualizing towns were more likely to sell shares conditional on   30 
the observed covariates and changes in them: the buy-sell ratio increased by e
0.121 – 1 = 12.8% in 
the demutualizing towns.
10 
Panel B relates the instrumented net cash withdrawal to changes in right-of-center vote 
shares. The result is a positive relation between net cash withdrawal and right-of-center vote 
shares, with t-values ranging from 0.9 and 1.4. The statistical insignificance of these effects, 
combined with the fact that the majority of the new shareholders did not sell their shares, suggest 
changes in liquid wealth did not fully drive the voting patterns. Leaving the issue of statistical 
significance aside, the point estimates reported in the full  model (Column 5) imply a 
(1+0.128)
0.330 – 1 = 4.1% increase in right-of-center vote share due to additional cash withdrawal 
in the demutualizing towns. When compared to the 7.8% total increase in right-of-center vote 
share, the point estimate suggests that the additional selling cannot fully explain the total effect 
of demutualizations on right-of-center voting.  
C.  Taxes 
Besides  wealth-related channels, tax issues can provide asset owners with an  increased 
incentive to vote right-of-center. The demutualization did not cause significant changes in the 
taxation of cash distributions to owners: mutual companies and corporations faced the same flat 
corporate income tax rate and similar tax treatment of cash distributions to owners. However, the 
mutual form allowed customer-owners to derive untaxed benefits in the form of a customer 
discount on their phone bills.  After ownership and phone services were decoupled in the 
demutualization, customers lost the discount. This loss increased the phone companies’ profits, 
leading to increased  corporate  taxes.  In  the  case of the largest of the demutualized firms 
                                                 
10 Unreported results show the additional selling was not particularly widespread in the demutualizing towns. 
About 80% of the original recipients kept the shares until the end of the sample period in 2003.   31 
(Helsingin Puhelin),  the customer discount had been about 60 euros per year before the 
conversion. The corporate tax rate at the time was 26%. Losing 60 euros in tax-free benefits and 
gaining the same amount in pretax profits thus implies an increase of 15.60 euros (= 0.26 × 60 
euros) in taxes paid per year.
11 For the median income earner, this amount corresponds to an 
increase in total annual tax burden of about 0.2%. 
Although any increase in taxes in principle increases the incentive to vote for lower tax 
policies at the margin,  we are skeptical about the  ability  of this tax effect to generate the 
magnitude of the change we observe in right-of-center voting. The amounts involved were small, 
and the chances of a single voter affecting tax policy even smaller. In expectation, the small 
amount and policy uncertainty likely rendered the tax benefits insignificant.  
D.  Stock ownership salience 
The previous section argued that increases in wealth, and in liquid wealth in particular, are 
unlikely to fully explain the voting patterns around the demutualizations. The conversions did 
affect tax benefits, but they were likely too small and uncertain to fully explain the results. An 
alternative channel is stock ownership salience; that is, the demutualization induced a shift in 
attention. 
The salience of stock ownership can work in various ways in influencing behavior. First, 
newly minted stockholders can start paying more attention to economic issues, increasing the 
weight of these issues in their voting decisions. Van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2011) show that 
stock market participation correlates strongly with interest in economic issues, and Bonaparte 
                                                 
11 This calculation makes the following assumptions: the companies were operating close to breakeven profits 
before the demutualization effectively passing on all benefits to customer-owners; company unit sales and costs are 
unaffected when it starts selling at the market price; and labor supply is fixed (i.e., individuals do not increase their 
working hours in response to an increase in their phone bills).   32 
and Kumar (2013) report evidence showing that stockholders spend more time reading 
newspapers. 
Second, stock ownership may induce a change in the frame of reference. A mutual company 
combines the roles of a customer and an owner,  whereas  these roles are unbundled in a 
demutualization. A resulting increase in the salience of ownership could shift the balance toward 
identifying oneself as an investor. More salient stock ownership and the changes in identity 
could  necessitate a change  in  voting behavior to align actions with the new group identity. 
Akerlof and Kranton (2010) argue identity influences economic decisions whereas Mullainathan 
and Washington (2009) show how cognitive dissonance affects political attitudes. Empirical 
evidence suggests priming of a particular identity (such as gender, religion, ethnicity, or race) 
has a strong effect on decisions in many domains, including risk-taking, co-operative behavior, 
time preferences, and voting (see, e.g., Chen and Li, 2009; Benjamin, Choi, and Strickland, 
2010; Klor and Shayo, 2010). Particularly informative in our setting is the finding in Di Tella, 
Galiani, and Schargrotsky (2007) that Buenos Aires squatters who were given land titles 
developed more individualist and materialist beliefs. 
Third, salience might amplify the effect of any changes in direct economic incentives. For 
example, the newly minted stockholders might account for larger benefits from right-of-center 
policies than what would objectively seem to accrue due to property rights and tax issues. The 
listing of the stock could also make the financial value of the asset more visible to the owner, 
leading to a perceived wealth effect, even if such a wealth effect does not objectively exist. 
A common thread in all these factors is that the underlying reason for changing political 
behavior is due to stock ownership becoming more salient.    33 
7.  Conclusion 
Theory and political commentary suggest ownership matters for political behavior. It can 
affect both the content of political beliefs and the level of political activity. Empirical evidence 
on the phenomenon, however, is  scarce. Using a series of demutualizations as a source of 
plausibly exogenous variation in stock ownership, we show a  positive and  economically 
significant effect on right-of-center vote share. The institutional features, as well as our statistical 
methods, give confidence in that this inference is not impaired by endogeneity issues. Both the 
2SLS regressions and covariate matching methods yield positive and significant estimates, and 
the estimates imply effect sizes of similar  magnitude. The matching method that allows the 
inclusion of pre-treatment right-of-center vote trends and levels as additional controls is a 
particularly powerful remedy against potential violations of the exclusion restriction. In effect, it 
rules out any confounds that work through the differences in the political environment between 
the treatment and control towns prior to the demutualizations. These include, but are not limited 
to, a larger right-of-center voter base and also a pre-demutualization trend towards more right-of-
center support that could potentially influence the town’s likelihood to demutualize. 
We also report somewhat weaker evidence of a positive effect on voter turnout. We consider 
various transmission mechanisms and show that wealth, liquidity, and tax incentives are unlikely 
explanations for all the patterns we observe. A potential channel that can explain the findings 
involves stock  ownership salience: voting decisions are affected by increased attention to 
economic issues, and a shift in issue framing toward an investor’s point of view and free-market 
policy, fostered by the ownership of listed stock. 
That even a relatively small change in ownership can have a decisive effect on elections has 
interesting implications for public policy: sometimes changing people’s frame of reference can   34 
be easier than changing their direct incentives. This relative ease helps us understand why right-
of-center politicians may use ownership as a strategic tool to attract the median voter to their 
party, as implied by Biais and Perotti (2002), as well as political commentary about President 
Bush’s Ownership Society initiative (Barnes, 2004; Nadler, 2000). The political implications of 
pension system and property-rights reforms are therefore  potentially far-reaching. Pension 
systems that rely increasingly on defined contributions and individually managed retirement 
accounts may make equity markets more salient to voters. Sweden and Slovakia recently moved 
to pension systems with an option to place part of the pension contribution into a private 
Individual Retirement Account, and other countries are investigating similar reforms. Even 
greater changes in private ownership of assets are taking place in emerging markets, such as 
China: a 1998 reform privatized much of the housing stock, and more than 100 million stock 
trading accounts existed on the Chinese exchanges as of January 2009. 
The general implication of this paper is that the types of financial instruments people hold 
can be consequential to their actions. The theory of cognitive dissonance, broadly speaking, 
suggests current behavior affects future attitude. The use of financial instruments can thus have 
other interesting feedback effects  as well. For example, engaging in socially responsible 
investment could make investors more ethical, investing in certain consumer-product 
manufacturers could make investors view the firms’ products more positively, and investing in a 
low-cost index fund could enhance a belief in market efficiency. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics 
The data include vote shares, share-ownership rates, and control variables at the zip-code level. Statistics in panels A 
and B are calculated over all the parliamentary elections in 1995, 1999, and 2003. The right-of-center, left-of-center, 
and center vote shares are defined as the share of votes cast for the National Coalition Party, the Social Democrat 
Party plus the Left Coalition Party, and the Center Party, respectively. In addition to these four parties, the largest 
parties’ vote share includes the Green League and the Swedish People’s Party. Voter turnout is the number of voters 
divided by the voting-aged (over 18 years) population. Share ownership is the number of shareholders divided by 
the number of inhabitants. Treated towns are municipalities that belong to the operating areas of the three 
demutualized telecom companies. Wealth and income are calculated as averages across households in a zip code and 
are measured in thousand euros. College degrees equals the share of inhabitants with a college degree. 
Unemployment is the share of inhabitants who are unemployed at the end of the year. Home owners is the share of 
owner-occupied dwellings in the area. Population density is the number of inhabitants divided by the area of the zip 
code and is measured in thousand inhabitants per km
2. Females is the share of the female population. Panel C reports 
regressions of the demutualization indicator against town characteristics where the unit of observation is a town in 
the year 1995 (prior to any demutualizations). The two left-most columns report coefficients from a linear 
probability model whereas the remaining columns in the panel reports logit marginal effects evaluated at the means 
of all the explanatory variables. The t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. 
 
Panel A: Treated towns (n of zip codes = 376) 
   Mean  Sd  Min  p25  Median  p75  Max 
Right-of-center vote share  22.24  8.61  1.79  16.07  21.43  27.84  55.95 
Left-of-center vote share  33.29  10.39  5.86  25.65  33.89  40.06  67.86 
Center vote share  14.59  12.32  0.00  6.09  9.35  19.00  63.27 
Largest parties vote share  88.42  3.60  67.01  86.04  88.59  90.98  102.22 
Voter turnout  45.10  6.91  22.21  41.10  45.38  49.57  67.97 
Share-ownership rate  19.54  9.64  1.28  11.56  18.98  26.07  50.06 
Wealth  57.08  42.61  8.93  35.85  47.21  62.34  419.42 
Income  16.74  3.92  7.50  13.89  16.57  19.53  32.36 
College degrees  10.25  6.79  0.34  5.44  8.61  13.26  36.44 
Unemployment  6.35  3.22  0.58  3.65  5.94  8.42  18.03 
Home ownership  27.86  6.70  0.13  25.21  29.11  32.22  44.58 
Population density  1.29  2.18  0.00  0.03  0.38  1.68  23.50 
Females  50.88  2.97  36.14  49.03  50.65  52.32  62.95 
                       
Panel B: Control towns (n of zip codes = 2,082) 
   Mean  Sd  Min  p25  Median  p75  Max 
Right-of-center vote share  12.72  8.93  0.14  5.40  10.92  18.59  64.19 
Left-of-center vote share  29.13  14.90  0.00  17.79  28.55  39.13  89.21 
Center vote share  40.45  22.33  0.00  22.07  42.04  58.33  92.86 
Largest parties vote share  90.73  6.01  37.91  88.41  91.78  94.44  103.57 
Voter turnout  39.71  10.65  0.00  32.53  39.13  45.65  155.80 
Share-ownership rate  7.86  4.09  0.55  5.00  7.23  9.89  63.14 
Wealth  45.25  17.41  10.31  32.75  41.70  53.85  162.42 
Income  12.01  3.00  6.27  9.68  11.55  13.94  23.46 
College degrees  3.91  2.84  0.16  1.94  3.28  5.09  25.00 
Unemployment  8.18  3.48  0.00  5.71  7.75  10.17  40.00 
Home ownership  32.10  5.26  0.24  29.26  32.37  35.22  63.17 
Population density  0.14  0.46  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.03  5.95 
Females  48.71  2.90  35.96  46.97  48.96  50.52  60.80 
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Panel C: Regressions of demutualization indicator 
Dependent variable  Demutualization indicator 
Reporting  Logit marginal effects 
Specification  1  2 
Wealth  0.183  0.157 
   (6.50)  (5.86) 
Income  0.095  0.122 
   (1.38)  (1.80) 
College degrees  0.074  0.072 
   (4.57)  (4.77) 
Unemployment  0.023  0.026 
   (0.70)  (0.74) 
Home ownership  –0.072  –0.052 
   (–1.88)  (–1.65) 
Population density  0.021  0.012 
   (4.48)  (2.51) 
Females  –0.146  –0.188 
   (–0.82)  (–1.04) 
Pre-treatment right-of-center vote level     –0.170 
      (–9.06) 
Pre-treatment right-of-center vote trend     0.054 
      (4.41) 
        
Age controls  Yes  Yes 
        
Pseudo-R
2  0.392  0.428 
Number of observations  2,328  2,328 
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Table 2 
First stage – Effect of demutualizations on share ownership 
The table reports results of OLS regressions that explain the share-ownership rate at the time of the 1995 and 2003 
elections. The dependent variable is defined as the log of the share-ownership rate, i.e., the number of shareholders 
divided by the number of inhabitants. The demutualization dummy takes the value of one if the town has fully 
undergone the conversion of its local telecom firm to a publicly listed company at the time of the election. The 
regressions take the natural logarithm of all continuous control variables and the coefficients can thus be interpreted 
directly as elasticities. Control variables are as defined in Table 1. The regressions in columns 2 through 5 also 
include age controls that calculate the share of inhabitants in 10-year intervals. Columns 4 and 5 break down the 
explanatory variables from columns 2 and 3, respectively, into 10 decile dummies (1 omitted). The F-statistic is for 
the null that the instrument does not add to the first stage model. The t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and clustering at the zip-code level. 
 
Dependent variable  Share ownership 
Specification  OLS 
   1  2  3  4  5 
Demutualization dummy  0.396  0.500  0.528  0.529  0.538 
   (22.07)  (25.86)  (27.18)  (25.77)  (26.37) 
Wealth     0.321  0.261       
      (6.93)  (5.68)       
Income     0.083  –0.020       
      (0.91)  (–0.21)       
College degrees     0.039  0.029       
      (2.12)  (1.56)       
Unemployment     0.007  –0.010       
      (0.30)  (–0.41)       
Home ownership        0.552       
         (4.82)       
Population density        –0.066       
         (–2.09)       
Females        –0.285       
         (–1.37)       
                 
Zip-code fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Election fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Age controls  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Decile dummies 1  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Decile dummies 2  No  No  No  No  Yes 
                 
F-statistic for instrument  470.4  675.8  757.6  669.4  699.9 
Overall R
2  0.177  0.309  0.415  0.247  0.148 
Number of observations  4,596  4,596  4,596  4,596  4,596 
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Table 3 
Second stage – Effect of share ownership on voting 
The table reports results of two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions that explain the vote share of the right-of-
center National Coalition party in the 1995 and 2003 elections. The 2SLS procedure in Panel A instruments share 
ownership by using the regressions in Table 2 as the first stage. Panel B reports the corresponding OLS estimates. 
The regressions take the natural logarithm of all continuous variables (both the dependent and the independent 
variables) and the coefficients can thus be interpreted directly as elasticities. Control variables are as defined in 
Table 1. The regressions in columns 2 through 5 also include age controls that calculate the share of inhabitants in 
10-year intervals. Columns 4 and 5 break down the explanatory variables from columns 2 and 3, respectively, into 
10 decile dummies (1 omitted). The t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at 
the zip-code level. 
 
Panel A: 2SLS regressions 
Dependent variable  Right-of-center vote share 
Specification  1  2  3  4  5 
Share ownership  0.324  0.210  0.190  0.150  0.139 
   (4.32)  (3.21)  (3.03)  (2.22)  (2.09) 
Wealth     0.135  0.161       
      (2.11)  (2.51)       
Income     0.355  0.406       
      (2.51)  (2.83)       
College degrees     –0.002  0.001       
      (–0.09)  (0.02)       
Unemployment     –0.080  –0.073       
      (–2.25)  (–2.04)       
Home ownership        –0.199       
         (–1.54)       
Population density        –0.007       
         (–0.22)       
Females        0.440       
         (1.40)       
                 
Zip-code fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Election fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Age controls  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Decile dummies 1  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Decile dummies 2  No  No  No  No  Yes 
                 
Overall R
2  0.180  0.266  0.274  0.239  0.132 
Number of observations  4,596  4,596  4,596  4,596  4,596 
                 
Panel B: OLS regressions 
Dependent variable  Right-of-center vote share 
Specification  1  2  3  4  5 
Share ownership  0.129  0.103  0.106  0.087  0.091 
   (4.50)  (3.43)  (3.52)  (2.75)  (2.84) 
                 
Overall R
2  0.173  0.251  0.253  0.218  0.104 
Number of observations  4,596  4,596  4,596  4,596  4,596 
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Table 4 
Matching estimators 
The table shows the influence of share ownership on right-of-center voting using estimators that match the treated 
areas to a control sample based on the nearest-neighbor method developed in Abadie and Imbens (2006). Right-of-
center voting is measured as the change in the logged right-of-center vote share from 1995 to 2003 and covariates 
used in matching are the same as the control variables in Table 3 (wealth, income, college degrees, homeowners, 
population density, and age composition), broken down into decile dummies. In addition, the analysis uses the level 
of the logged right-of-center vote share in 1995 and the change in the logged right-of-center vote share from 1991 to 
1995 to match the treatment towns to the nearest neighbors. All the variables are measured as of 1995 before the 
demutualizations took place. Panels A through D consider matching based on 1, 2, 4, and 6 nearest neighbors, 
respectively. Specifications 1 and 2 use the matching metric based on the inverse-of-the-variances distance (Abadie 
and  Imbens, 2006) and the Mahalanobis distance (Rubin, 1980). Specification 3 applies the bias correction to 
account for the discrepancy in observables of the treatment and control towns from Abadie and Imbens (2011). 
 






















   1  2  3     1  2  3 
Treatment effect  0.121  0.119  0.124     0.120  0.118  0.123 
z-value  (3.49)  (3.66)  (3.64)     (3.98)  (3.98)  (4.49) 
Number of observations  2,328  2,328  2,328     2,328  2,328  2,328 
                       





















   1  2  3     1  2  3 
Treatment effect  0.123  0.119  0.092     0.122  0.127  0.105 
z-value  (4.55)  (4.75)  (3.90)     (4.65)  (5.40)  (4.57) 
Number of observations  2,328  2,328  2,328     2,328  2,328  2,328 
 
     45 
Table 5 
Alternative vote-share specifications 
The table reports results from alternative specifications that vary the definition of the dependent variable. Otherwise 
the models are identical to the 2SLS regression from the corresponding columns in Panel A of Table 3. Panel A in 
this table uses the vote share of the Center Party,  whereas  Panel B aggregates the Center Party  and  National 
Coalition  vote shares. Panel C measures the left-of-center share that aggregates the votes cast for the Social 
Democrat Party and the Left Coalition Party. Panels D and E scale the votes cast for the Center Party and National 
Coalition with the votes cast for the six parties that have repeatedly appeared on the list of the largest parties. In 
addition to the National Coalition, Center Party, Social Democrat, and Left Coalition parties, the largest parties’ vote 
share includes the Green League and the Swedish People’s Party. The t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and clustering at the zip-code level. 
 
Specification  2SLS 
   1  2  3  4  5 
Panel A: Dep var = Center Party vote share 
Coefficient  0.946  0.604  0.557  0.336  0.331 
t-value  (12.94)  (12.11)  (12.01)  (7.85)  (7.88) 
Overall R
2  0.136  0.004  0.047  0.010  0.025 
Number of observations  4,776  4,776  4,776  4,776  4,776 
Panel B: Dep var = Center Party and National Coalition vote share 
Coefficient  0.368  0.265  0.247  0.165  0.163 
t-value  (10.07)  (9.10)  (8.96)  (5.92)  (5.96) 
Overall R
2  0.029  0.000  0.051  0.0002  0.002 
Number of observations  4,785  4,785  4,785  4,785  4,785 
Panel C: Dep var = Social Democrat and Left Coalition Party vote share 
Coefficient  –0.167  –0.096  –0.081  –0.074  –0.077 
t-value  (–3.69)  (–2.47)  (–2.20)  (–1.87)  (–1.98) 
Overall R
2  0.002  0.212  0.001  0.175  0.177 
Number of observations  4,770  4,770  4,770  4,770  4,770 
Panel D: Dep var = Vote share of all right-of-center parties excluding small parties 
Coefficient  0.285  0.166  0.148  0.121  0.110 
t-value  (3.84)  (2.56)  (2.39)  (1.80)  (1.67) 
Overall R
2  0.183  0.280  0.284  0.257  0.166 
Number of observations  4,596  4,596  4,596  4,596  4,596 
Panel E: Dep var = Vote share of Center Party and National Coalition excluding small parties 
Coefficient  0.313  0.213  0.198  0.135  0.135 
t-value  (9.44)  (8.11)  (7.96)  (5.34)  (5.41) 
Overall R
2  0.028  0.003  0.057  0.006  0.0002 
Number of observations  4,781  4,781  4,781  4,781  4,781 
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Table 6 
Excluding towns with no mutuals 
The table reports results from an alternative specification that discards all the towns that were not served by a mutual 
telecom firm. The excluded towns were the operating areas of the partially government-owned Telecom Finland 
(later TeliaSonera). Otherwise, the models are identical to the OLS regressions in Table 2 (Panel A) and to the 2SLS 
regression in Table 3 (Panel B). The t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at 
the zip-code level. 
 
Panel A: First-stage regressions 
Dependent variable  Share ownership 
Specification  1  2  3  4  5 
Demutualization dummy  0.415  0.486  0.513  0.513  0.521 
   (20.98)  (22.75)  (24.40)  (21.93)  (22.45) 
                 
Overall R
2  0.255  0.465  0.001  0.428  0.123 
Number of observations  2,452  2,452  2,452  2,452  2,452 
                 
Panel B: Second-stage regressions 
Dependent variable  Right-of-center vote share 
Specification  1  2  3  4  5 
Share ownership  0.312  0.200  0.198  0.154  0.144 
   (4.70)  (3.09)  (3.19)  (2.28)  (2.17) 
Wealth     0.104  0.107       
      (1.40)  (1.39)       
Income     0.230  0.237       
      (1.33)  (1.35)       
College degrees     –0.039  –0.041       
      (–1.10)  (–1.14)       
Unemployment     –0.116  –0.107       
      (–2.76)  (–2.50)       
Home ownership        0.082       
         (0.57)       
Population density        0.042       
         (0.71)       
Females        0.569       
         (1.42)       
                 
Zip-code fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Election fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Age controls  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Decile dummies 1  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Decile dummies 2  No  No  No  No  Yes 
                 
Overall R
2  0.189  0.230  0.294  0.238  0.203 
Number of observations  2,452  2,452  2,452  2,452  2,452   47 
Table 7 
Effect of share ownership on voter turnout 
The table reports results of two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions that explain voter turnout in the 1995 and 
2003 elections. Voter turnout is defined as the number of voters divided by the voting-aged (over 18 years) 
population. The 2SLS procedure instruments for share ownership by using the regressions in Table 2 as the first 
stage. The regressions take the natural logarithm of all continuous variables and the coefficients can thus be 
interpreted directly as elasticities. Control variables are as defined in Table 1. The regressions also include 
unreported age controls that calculate the share of inhabitants in 10-year intervals. Columns 4 and 5 break down the 
explanatory variables from columns 2 and 3, respectively, into 10 decile dummies (1 omitted). The t-statistics in 
parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the zip-code level. 
 
Dependent variable  Voter turnout 
Specification  2SLS 
   1  2  3  4  5 
Share ownership  0.075  0.050  0.057  0.021  0.025 
   (2.54)  (1.95)  (2.30)  (0.82)  (0.99) 
Wealth     –0.083  –0.091       
      (–3.52)  (–3.85)       
Income     –0.143  –0.159       
      (–2.76)  (–3.00)       
College degrees     –0.008  –0.009       
      (–0.77)  (–0.90)       
Unemployment     –0.001  –0.003       
      (–0.08)  (–0.21)       
Home ownership        0.067       
         (1.43)       
Population density        0.002       
         (0.18)       
Females        –0.108       
         (–0.94)       
                 
Zip-code fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Election fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Age controls  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Decile dummies 1  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Decile dummies 2  No  No  No  No  Yes 
                 
Overall R
2  0.070  0.011  0.013  0.030  0.050 
Number of observations  4,788  4,788  4,788  4,788  4,788 
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Table 8 
Effect of liquid wealth on voting 
The table reports results of two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions that explain the change in the logged right-of-
center vote share from 1995 to 2003. Unit of observation is a zip code, and the dependent and control variables are 
measured as changes in logged values of the variables between 1995 and 2003. The regressions also include the 
logged values of the variables in 1995 as additional controls. Net cash is measured as the logged ratio of the total 
value of all sell transactions to the total value of all buy transactions in a zip code from 1995 to 2003. Panels A and 
B report the first-stage and the second-stage results, respectively. Columns 4 and 5 break down the explanatory 
variables from columns 2 and 3, respectively, into 10 decile dummies (1 omitted). The t-statistics in parentheses are 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity. 
 
Panel A: First-stage regressions 
Dependent variable  Net cash withdrawals 
Specification  1  2  3  4  5 
Demutualization dummy  0.112  0.107  0.116  0.110  0.121 
   (3.92)  (3.52)  (3.69)  (3.61)  (3.78) 
                 
Adjusted R
2  0.043  0.052  0.051  0.055  0.048 
Number of observations  2,230  2,230  2,230  2,230  2,230 
                 
Panel B: Second-stage regressions 
Dependent variable  Right-of-center vote share 
Specification  1  2  3  4  5 
Net cash withdrawals  0.392  0.287  0.270  0.408  0.330 
   (1.35)  (0.93)  (0.90)  (1.37)  (1.18) 
Wealth     0.211  0.206       
      (2.18)  (2.13)       
Income     1.355  1.389       
      (6.04)  (6.15)       
College degrees     0.064  0.065       
      (1.33)  (1.37)       
Unemployment     –0.001  –0.006       
      (–0.02)  (–0.09)       
Home ownership        –0.209       
         (–1.35)       
Population density        –0.058       
         (–2.12)       
Females        0.104       
         (0.21)       
                 
Age controls  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Decile dummies 1  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Decile dummies 2  No  No  No  No  Yes 
                 
Adjusted R
2  0.311  0.352  0.355  0.326  0.352 
Number of observations  2,230  2,230  2,230  2,230  2,230   49 
 
 
Figure 1. Treatment towns  and zip codes. The map shows Southern and Central Finland by zip code. The 
treatment areas, that is, the zip codes in which a demutualizing telecom company had a local fixed line monopoly, 
are shaded. The lowest treatment area centers around the capital, Helsinki (firm 1), the northern one around the city 
of Jyväskylä (firm 2), and the middle one around the city of Tampere (firm 3). 




Figure 2. Share-ownership rate in treatment and control zip codes. The treatment zip codes are in towns in 
which the mutually owned local telecom company was converted into a publicly listed company. The control areas 
are all the other zip codes. 
 
 
Figure 3. Right-of-center vote share in treatment and control zip codes. This figure plots the share of votes cast 
for the right-of-center National Coalition Party in the Finnish parliamentary elections. The treatment zip codes are in 
towns in which the mutually owned local telecom company was converted into a publicly listed company. The 
control areas are all the other zip codes. 
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